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Abstract: A combined philosophical and social psychological study of
over 40 of the Apollo moon scientists reveals that the Orthodox or Received
View of Scientific Theories is found wanting in several respects: (1) observa-
tions are not theory-free; (2) scientific observations are not "directly
observable;" (3) observations are no less problematic than theories.
The study also raises some severe criticisms of the distinction between
the context of discovery and the context of justification. Not only does
this distinction fail to describe the actual practice of science but even
more important it has the dangerous effect of excluding some of the strongest
lines of evidence which could most effectively challenge the distinction.
The distinction is harmful of efforts to found interdisciplinary theories
and philosophies of science.
This paper is strongly supportive of Kuhn's efforts to introduce
social psychological considerations into the philosophy of science. It is
concerned with showing what the social psychology of research distinctively
has to contribute to the philosophy of science by drawing the philosophical
implications of a specific study of an interesting group of contemporary
scientists. While basically in agreement with Kuhn, the paper nevertheless
shows that substantial modifications of Kuhn's position are in order. These
modifications could not have been arrived at without recourse to social psy-
chological considerations in some form or another. Social psychology has
a greater role to play than philosophers of science have traditionally
been willing to grant it. It is certainly not limited to uncovering mere
matters of empirical fact.
i
Introduction
This paper represents a partial and greatly abbreviated report
of a philosophical case study of the psychology of the Apollo moon scientists.
The subjects of the study were over 40 of the scientists who participated
in the Apollo lunar missions. The basic purpose of the study was to test
certain contemporary and critical propositions in the sociology, psycho-
logy and philosophy of science by means of a combined philosophical and
behavioral science investigation into the attitudes, beliefs, and practices
of a highly interesting yet specific group of scientists. Each scientist
in the study was intensively interviewed on four separate occasions over
a span of three years. The scientists were generally interviewed in the
time period just after the completion of one Apollo mission and before
the start of another, thus between Apollo 11 and 12, 12 and 14, 14 and 15,
and 15 and 16.
The central question with which the study began and which
occupied it throughout was the following: Would it be possible to identify
and to study those scientists, if any, who exhibited a high degree of prior
commitment (i.e., before Apollo 11) to certain pet hypotheses or theories
regarding the nature and/or origin of the moon and who thus showed as a
result a high degree of reluctance to give up their pet hypotheses in the
face of or in spite of the data returned subsequently from the moon? In
terms of the interviews with the 40 scientists, a small number of scientists
were overwhelmingly and consistently nominated by their peers as the ones
"most likely to hang onto their pet hypotheses 'til death do them part."
/
The perceptions of these few key scientists by their peers (the 40
scientists) were repeatedly studied over each interview round for their
implications for the sociology, psychology, and philosophy of science.
In general the issues and subsequent topics that were investigated were
too numerous for us just to be able to list them, let alone for us to
report the results of them here. However, in terms of the central issue of
commitment it was shown that it was possible to measure systematically
and precisely the differences in psychology
between (1) those scientists who were judged most likely to become
committed to pet hypotheses and to take strong stands on scientific
issues and (2) those who were judged to avoid taking strong stands or
not to develop intense commitments. Not only were the differences between
these two "types" of scientists immensely striking, but they were also,
in statistical terms, highly significant. Furthermore they emerged con-
tinually. No matter what was used to measure them, the same differences were
obtained repeatedly. In short the study revealed that there are indeed
definitive and very strong systematic differences between different kinds
of scientists. Most of all, it is possible to capture and to
measure these differences in psychology systematically and precisely.
One of the major purposes of this paper is to draw the significance of
these results for the philosophy of science.
Another major part of the study was concerned with the precise
measurement, in information theoretic terms [184g], of the change in
scientific beliefs of the scientists with respect to certain hypotheses
proposed for the origin of the moon and to account for its properties.
To this end, repeated measurements were taken with respect to how
probable or likely each scientist thought the various scientific hypotheses
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were at various points in the conduct of the Apollo missions. The
beliefs and attitudes of the scientists were also studied and measured
with respect to certain basic issues in the philosophy of science.
Considerations of space prevent us from reporting here on the information
theoretic analysis of the change in beliefs with respect to scientific
hypotheses. However we will comment briefly on some of the results having
to do with the questions that pertained to philosophical issues. Of
necessity, the reader is referred to a forthcoming book, The Subjective
Side of Science: A Philosophical Enquiry Into The Psychology Of The
Apollo Moon Scientists [33 ], for a full description of the study, e.g.,
a detailed description of the sample of scientists, the study's methodology,
its results, and most of all, its implications.
One of the major purposes of this paper is to demonstrate
what the social psychology of research uniquely has to contribute to the
philosophy of science. It is the contention of this paper that there are
certain contributions which are beyond the logic of science, at least as
it is currently constituted, to make. This paper thus enters centrally
into the recent dispute between Kuhn and Popper [253y] regarding the relative
merits of the logic of research and the social psychology of research.
In general this paper is supportive of the position of Kuhn, critical of
Popper's. However the paper does show that Kuhn's position is in need of
some fundamental revisions if it is to meet some of the criticisms that
Z3,45A•A6,5
have been legitimated lodged against it [ f ]. Some of the same revisions
will also be shown to apply to Feyerabend's position (s). Above all the
entire study mounts a severe critique of the orthodox [13 ] or received
view [41 ] of scientific theories. It is thus as a result very much in
sympathy with Toulmin's latest efforts [ 51 ].
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The Logic of Research Versus the Social
Psychology of Research: A False Dichotomy
and A Poor Policy for the Study of Science
If it can be argued that a scientific theory is a policy--
in effect, a directive--with respect to how one ought to view and to study
Nature [10A49], then I would argue that a theory about the nature of science
is also a policy, in this case, a policy with respect to how one ought
to study and to characterize science. That is, a particular theory about
the nature of science is obviously not a "factually real description of
science as 'it is'," but rather it directs those who hold the theory to
seek a particular kind of explanation of science. But if so, then a
particular theory about science is also at the same time a partial state
description of its adherents. As much as it tells us something about the
nature of science (which it does), it also tells us something about the
nature of its proponents. It certainly is expressive of their commitment(s)
to a particular point of view. In this regard, the current tendency to
view the logic of research and the social psychology of research as locked
in an adversary or "zero-sum game" situation may be more indicative of
the current state of our philosophy of science than it may be of either
science, logic, and social psychology themselves. Contrary to widespread
belief (or at least in certain quarters of the philosophical literature)
it does not follow that the only way to view thie relationship between
logic and social psychology is that of an adversary one or one of a
superior/inferior relationship. I would argue that not only are there
other ways to view the relationship, but that even more important, the
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failure to take seriously some of these other ways has actually impeded
some interesting new lines of research and developments in the philosophy
of science. Even worse, it has had the disastrous side effect of excluding
before the fact some of the strongest lines of evidence which could most
effectively challenge some of the prevailing points of view.
It would be considerably easier to accept the arguments-of
those who have been most severe in their condemnation of the social psycho-
logy of research and of its potential contributions to the philosophy of
science were it not for the following: (1) that in every case it is possible
to show [33] that their own position rests upon or embodies a particular,
largely implicit, social psychology; i.e., their own position rests upon
a number of propositions regarding the nature of science and scientists
which are sociological and psychological in their import; (2) that for the
most part this implicit "homespun" social psychology is inferior to the
professional products already available on the market (i.e., in the
professional literature); and (3) that the critics of social psychology
have for the most part exhibited a gross misunderstanding with respect
to the aims of the social psychology of research on the one hand and a
gross ignorance of the facts and methods of social psychology on the other.
Given this, it is little wonder then that the view of social psychology
which has largely been promulgated has tended to be the worst characteri-
zation of social psychology possible. For example, not only is it a
gross misunderstanding of the aims of social psychology but it is basically
demeaning of it to say that its potential contributions are limited to
"uncovering mere matters of empirical fact" or that it is perpetually
relegated to studying only those aspects of science having to do with the
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messy illogical aspects of discovery. It is also a misunderstanding
to perveive it as having little if anything to contribute to the study
of the epistemology of testing scientific ideas. Given these perceptions
of the role of social psychology, it is little wonder then why any appeal
to the social psychology of research has tended to be met with charges of
sociologism or psychologism.
It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper to demonstrate
the actual psychology that is implicit in the views of those who are critical
of thile s;octlal p:;ycho:logy of rc:searchll [ce.,32,3]. Ilnsc;td( the focus
is on demiion::;trating how the soc:i.al. psychology of research can be
brought to bear on philosophical problems and how social psychology can
form an essential part of an integrated program in the philosophy of
science. In this regard it should be noted that C. West Churchman has
9
consistently articulated a philosophy of science [567), wherein the logic
of research and the social psychology of research are taken as vital but
yet as only partial components of the program. In other words, neither the
logic nor the social psychology of research form the whole or the core of
the program. Indeed, no single science forms the core or becomes the single
basis for explicating science. All of the sciences now known are conceived
of as indispensible in the sense that there is an aspect of the process of
science that each of the various sciences is uniquely suited to uncovering
and to studying. Viewed from this perspective, the relationship between
the logic and the social psychology of research is a complimentary one,
not a hostile adversary relationship, although it is vitally necessary that
each of these components be free to criticize the other. In terms of this
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view of science, the Reichenbach distinction [40,4-1] between the context
of discovery and the context of justification is not only naive but it is actual-
ly harmful to studies into the nature of science. The distinction is
regarded as naive because a Churchmanian view of science does not recognize
that scientific activity can be fundamentally partitioned into discovery
versus testing or justification phases; i.e., it doesnot recognize that
there is a sharp cleavage between the acts of discovery and of testing,
and as a result, it does see where the process of discovery can be expli-
cated independently of the process of testing, and vice versa. As a
consequence, it also regards the distinction as harmful because it not only
promotes a separatist, piece-meal view of science in theory but also in practice;
e.g., it discourages the kind of broad-based interdisciplinary studies
which could uncover the necessary evidence that could effectively challenge
the basis for the distinction in the first place. The study on which this
paper is based is in effect an example of a Churchmanian program in the
philosophy of science.
On the Nature and Function of Commitment
and Bias in Science: The Case For Scientists
As Highly Partisan Advocates
One of the (if not the) most striking things about the contents
of the interviews was the tremendous extent to which they documented the
intense emotions that permeate the entire process of science. No matter
what the topic that was being discussed--for example, the status of a certain
physical theory--the scientists continuously moved the discussion toward a
consideration of highly personal matters and social concerns which effected
their stance toward the topic. It was fundamentally impossible for them
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to discuss the status of a physical theory and the evidence pro and con with
respect to that theory without their reacting to the proponents of that
theory and in the most intense and volatile of terms. It would appear that
it is only in idealized accounts of science that scientists are able to keep
their personal feelings toward the issues (and particularly their feelings
toward those of their peers who are associated with the issues) clearly
apart from their abstract, impersonal thoughts about the issues. This is
not to say that scientists ought not to keep the two clearly apart. It is
to say however that the reasons that have been advanced in support of separ-
ating the two largely amount to meaningless prescriptions if scientists
are psychologically unable to obey them in the heat of practice. If scientists
are to keep these two aspects apart then we will have to provide them with
far more effective means that will actually allow them to accomplish this.
Indeed if it is fundamentally impossible to confine intense emotions in
science to a particular area,then the most effect means would be a theory about
how emotions actually function in the whole of the scientific process so that we
could effectively account for their influence. If we could thus account for them,
we would not have to worry about eliminating or confining them. Whatever the
outcome, mere prescriptions and abstract discourses on "good scientific method"
alone do not seem sufficient to do the job (they are necessary however).
Furthermore, it is even debatable whether scientists should always keep the
two apart. If there are good reasons for keeping the highly personal (and
supposedly subjective) apart (or at the very least,distinguishable) from the
impersonal (and supposedly objective), then there are also good reasons for
not separating the two. The latter reasons deserve as much serious consideration
as the former have received.
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From the interviews it is abundantly clear that scientific
ideas are not only tested against an elaborate background of prior theories
and ideas but they are also tested against an elaborate network of prior
social and personal relations. While theories, ideas, and evidence have
an abstrac-t and impersonal side, they also have a strong concrete and a
personal dimension. In many cases this personal dimension actually overwhelms
the impersonal. It certainly always influences it.
The interviews make abundantly clear that theories are associated
with particular men who serve and are identified as the personal advocates
of those theories. This is particularly the case all the more that the
theories are bold, provocative, and all encompassing. To disprove, to
falsify a theory is not merely to discredit an abstract entity but it is
also to discredit the idea and position of a scientist who is personally
associated with that idea and who has a stake in it. It was clearly recognized
by the respondents that more often than not scientists were ardent, passionate,
partisan advocates for their personal theories and that scientists did every-
thing in their power (excluding cheating) to muster every bit of evidence
favorable to the theory that they could find. They were not out to falsify
their own theories but to confirm them. If they were out to falsify anything,
it was the theories of their opponents.
The foregoing do not merely represent my own conclusions and inter-
pretations of the interview materials but they also represent the perceptions
of many of the scientists themselves. Indeed the recognition of the pre-
ceding was so strong that time and time again virtually the entire sample of
over 40 scientists laughed at, and in the most derisive terms, the notion of
the dispassionate, unbiased, objective observer of Nature. Not only was it
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recognized that in point of actual conduct the scientist was more often than
not highly committed to a point of view--at the very least to his pet theories
and hypotheses--but even more interesting and important, strong reasons were
evinced why this ought to be the case, i.e., that ideally scientists ought
not to be without strong prior commitments. Now I am perfectly willing to
grant that many of these reasons are nothing more than outright rationali-
zations. Nevertheless even as rationalizations they are still worth con-
sidering, in fact all the more that they are, since they then represent
some of the functional norms and operating rules of practicing scientists.
Further they give one reason to pause and consider other models of science
which are not dependent on the presumption of untainted, unbiased observers
in order for scientific knowledge to result. Because of the importance of
these points, it is worth our while to present some representative excerpts
from the interviews:
Scientist A - "Bias has a role to play in science and it serves it
well. Part of the business [of science] is to sift
the evidence and to come to the right conclusion, and
to do this you must have people who argue for both
sides of the evidence. This is the only way
in which we can straighten the situation out. I
wouldn't like scientists to be without bias since a
lot of the sides of the argument would never be
presented. We must be emotionally committed to the
things we do energetically. No one is able to do
anything with liberal energy if there is no emotion
connected with it."
Scientist B - "The uninvolved, unemotional scientist is just as much
a fiction as the mad scientist who will destroy the world
for knowledge. Most of the scientists I know have theories
and are looking for data to support them; they're not
sorting impersonally through the data looking for a
theory to fit the data."
"You've got to make a clear distinction between not being
objective and cheating. A good scientist will not be
above changing his theory if he gets a preponderance of
evidence that doesn't support it, but basically he's
looking to defend it."
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"Without commitment one wouldn't have the energy, the
drive to press forward sometimes against extremely
difficult odds. Trying to collect data on the moon is
not the easiest thing in the world [this may be the biggest
understatement of the entire study]. There are not only
physical problems but there are bureaucratic problems
as well to fight."
"You don't consciously falsify evidence in science but
you put less priority on a pieceof data that goes against
you. No reputable scientist does this consciously but you
do it subconsciously."
"The experimentalist doesn't have to be committed to a
theory to do good work, but the theorist does, so the
exper:imentalists can call the theorists metaphysiLcians.
Lunar physi:cs is not typical of science; there have been
more theorists than experimentalists. It's a field
dominated by theorists; until 2 years ago it was impossible
to do experimental work on the moon."
Scientist C - "The disinterested scientist is a myth. Even if there
were such a being, he probably wouldn't be worth much
as a scientist. I still think you can be objective in
spite of having strong interests and bias."
"If you make neutral statements, nobody really listens
to you. You have to stick your neck out. The statements
you make in public are actually stronger than you believe
in. You have to get people to remember that you represent
a point of view even if for you it's just a possibility."
"It takes commitment to be a scientist. One thing that
spurs a scientist on is competition, warding off attacks
against what you've published."
Scientists D -
Scientist E -
"In order to be heard you have to overcommit yourself.
There's so much stuff if you don't speak out you
won't get heard but you can't be too outrageous
or you'll get labeled as a crackpot; you have to
be just outrageous enough. If you have an idea,
you have to pursue it as hard as you can. You have
to ride a horse to the end of the road."1
"The notion of the disinterested scientist is really
a myth that deserves to be put to rest. Those scientists
who are committed to the myth have an intensity of
commitment which belies the myth."
"Those scientists who are the movers are not indifferent.
One has to be deeply involved in order to do good work.
There is the danger that the bolder the scientist is
with regard to the nature of his ideas, the more likely
he is to become strongly committed to his ideas."
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"I don't think we have good science because we have
adversaries but that it is in the attempt to follow
the creed and the ritual of scientific method that
the scientist finds himself unconsciously thrust in
the role of an adversary."
It should be noted that the interview materials do not
entirely rule out a falsificationist interpretation of science. After all
these scientists like their colleagues elsewhere do test their ideas.
However the materials do not support the kind of falsificationism which
depends on the necessity of positing a firm distinction between the
context of discovery and the context of Justification [37 ]. The contexts
of discovery and of justification are at least bound together through
the intense emotional commitment that it requires of a scientist first to
discover his ideas and then subsequently to pursue their testing. In other
words, I think the process of testing or justification is intimately bound
to the process of discovery through the intense psychological emotions
which are needed to keep the whole process of scientific inquiry alive.
As I read the excerpts and the broader materials uncovered by the study
I am impressed by the fact that science advances not through the sole
efforts of individual men each "dispassionately" and "logically" testing
their own ideas but through a heated adversary process wherein one man
tests "his" discoveries against the discoveries of "another." The discoveries
of one man are passionately thrust against the discoveries of another man
in order to "test" both. Psychological energy and commitment infuses the
whole process to such a degree that it is silly in my opinion to say that
schientific inquiry naturally exhibits a clear-cut dividing line between
either individual scientists or the contexts of discovery and of justification.
In this sense the distinction between discovery and justification actually
embodies a naive social psychology of science. To remove commitment and
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and even bias from scientific inquiry may be to remove one of the strongest
sustaining forces for both the discovery of scientific ideas and for their
subsequent testing.
This is not to deny that this conception of science raises as
many problems as it promises to "solve". For example, it is unfortunately
beyond the scope of this paper [33 ] to demonstrate in detail how scientific
objectivity could still emerge from such a system. In a number of previous
papers [31,)3, I have tried to lay the foundation for a combined philosophical/
behavioral theory of science by outlining various epistemological and behavioral
mechanisms whereby a consensually based notion of scientific objectivity
could still result eventhough the starting point was an initial state of
strong conflict, i.e., strongly contending adversary positions. The goal
(as well as the problem) or such a conception is to show how objectivity
is possible not by excluding strong emotions from science (which is a
psychological impossibility) but to show how objectivity is possible
because of them, not in spite of them. As Churchman and Ackoff have put it:
Pragmatism does not advocate a scientist who removes
all his emotions, sympathies, and the like from his experi-
mental process. This is like asking the scientist to give
up being a whole man while he experiments. Perhaps a
man's emotion will be the most powerful instrument he has
at his disposal in reaching a conclusion. The main task,
however, is to enlarge the scope of the scientific model so
~- that we can begin to understand the role of the other types
of experience in reaching decisions, and can see how they
too can be checked and controlled. The moral, according
to the pragmatist, should not be to exclude feeling from
scientific method, but to include it in the sense of under-
standing it better [ 7 , pp. 224]. 
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Toward A More Precise Explication
Of the Differences Between the 'Great'
and the 'Normal' Scientist
Very early on during the first round of interviews, a number of
the scientists, independently of one another and of their own accord, sug-
gested a typology of different kinds of scientists. In their opinion,
their experience suggested that there were very sharp differences between
a relatively small number of fundamentally differing kinds of scientists.
Indeed, on presenting the typology to the rest of the sample for their
reaction and evaluation, a remarkable degree of consensus was obtained
as to , first, the validity of the typology, and then, second, the names
of those specific scientists who "most typified" each of the various "types."
The precision of the typology was continually refined on subsequent inter-
view rounds. In addition, the perceptions of those few scientists who
were most frequently nominated as best typifying the various types were
systematically measured. Each of the 40 scientists in the study reported
their perceptions of these few scientists in terms of a variety of attitudinal
scales.
Although the differences between the various "types" cannot be
reduced to a single or simple underlying dimension, the most fundamental
dimension and the one which originally suggested the typology was that of
"speculativeness" or "willingness to extrapolate beyond the available data."
In any social grouping, there are always those who prefer to stay close
to "the facts" and those who prefer to venture out beyond them even at the
risk of ignoring them. Type I scientists, as they were referred to, were
distinguished bythe essential defining quality that they excelled at
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extrapolating from data. Although they were often fine, detailed experi-
menters themselves and even at times enjoyed experimental results or
numbers for their, own sake, theorizing was obviously their most pleasurable
and exalted task. Type I scientists were willing and even relished the
bold intuitive and theoretical leaps always required in making inferences from
incomplete data to a comprehensive and encompassing theory. Type III
scientists, as they were referred to, represented the other end of the spectrum.
Here, numbers are often relished primarily for their own sake. There is a
preoccupation, even an obsession, with data gathering. There is often an
extreme disdain of theorists who deal with highly inferrential and abstract
concepts. Speculi-ation or extrapolation from data is valued little and
only engaged in when the data clearly warrants such extrapolation and then
only with extreme cautiousness. Where type I's more readily tended to see
the positive advantages of speculation in science and to speak glowingly of
it, type III's tended to disparage it. They tended to equate speculation
with wild theorizing and refer to it as "finger-painting in the sky."
Type III scientists are often seen as brilliant but extremely
narrow and specialized experimenters. In some instances, they are regarded
as nothing more than "super-technicians with a Ph.D." (In fairness, it
was noted that theorists can often be just as narrow. In general though,
it was the consensus opinion of the sample that it was much more difficult
for a theorist to be a narrow specialist than it was for an experimenter.
Theorizing on something so broad as the origin of the moon requires, by its
very nature, that'a scientist be familiar with, if not competent in, several
diverse scientifi'c fields.) Type II scientists represented something in
between. Here were to be found scientists who were equally capable of doing
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competent experimental work as well as engaging in modest theorizing and
extrapolating activities. From time to time, they could even rise to bold
feats of theorizing and extrapolation, but in general, they represented
the middle ground, running to neither of the extremes represented by Types I
and III.
Here, as with every topic investigated throughout the study,
it proved impossible to keep the exploration and assessment of a supposedly
abstract quality like that of speculation or the notion of different types
of scientists apart from a discussion of the personalities of specific
individuals. Indeed, the scientists discussed abstract issues in terms
of concrete specifics. Their comments were constantly peppered with highly
intense and even slanderous jibes at their colleagues. Although as a
general rule most of the scientists seemed to appreciate that a wide
variety of different types and styles were necessary for the advance of
science [2+ ], there were strong exceptions. There were more than just isolated
pockets of scientists who would be more than happy to see certain of their
colleagues disappear from science altogether, particularly those scientists
identified as the most extreme of the type I's.
The original typology of three types was refined in two ways:
1) each of the I, II, and III types was further subdivided; the final
typology thus contained six types instead of three; and 2) the number of
dimensions underlying the typology was expanded; this allowed the differences
between the types to be drawn more sharply and generally. While both of
these refinements were important,only the latter need concern us here.
Table 1 gives the results of one of the many exercises that were used to
measure more precisely the differences between type I, II, and III scientists.
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TABLE 1: ADJECTIVE PROFILES FOR THE DIFFERENT
TYPES OF SCIENTISTS
Scale !
# 11
_1
Biased-Impartial
1
SI3
Markedly
I TAqC1Fl)
TYPES
SII Y I
I. i *T..1 _- . _
Markedly
R T A ID
Moderately
P T A CFT
Neither or
Both
I MPARTIAL-
I BTASFD
Moderately
ITMPARTT AT.
SIII
ji'either or
|oth
'IMPARTIAL-
!RT ASFT
I ' ______ I U - IJr1A31AEL.t j bibthert N e L. -her
Brilliant-Dull Neither Neither
2 Extremely Markedly Markedly Markedly BRILLIANT IBRILLIANT
Nor 'Nor
__ BRILLIANT BRILLIANT BRILLIANT BRILLIANT DULL DULL
Theoretical- i Both Both
Practical Markedly Markedly Moderately' PRACTICAL PRACTICAL Moderately
3 And And 
;________ THEORETICAL THEORETICAL THEORETICAL THEORETICAL THEORETICAL PRACTICAL
Generalist-
Specialist 'Markedly Moderately Markedly Moderately . .Moderately larkedly
4
GENERALIST GENERALIST GENERALIST GENERALIST GENERALIST PECIALIST
Creative- Neither
Unimaginative Extremely Markedly Markedly Markedly Moderately CREATIVE
5 [ |Nor
__Iv __CREATIVE CREATIVE CREATIVE CREATIVE CREATIVE TUNMAINATIVE
Agrasalve- IExt~~~~~~[rkemaely 'oeatlRgeessiven Extremely Markedly dly Markedly Moderately ModeratelyRetiring
6
* ~~6 AGGRESSIVE AGGRESSIVE AGGRESSIVE AGGRESSIVE AGGRESSIVE AGGRESSIVE
Vague-Precise Neither or 
7 iBoth Moderately Moderately Markedly Moderately arkedly
VAGUE- I
PRECISE PRECISE PRECISE PRECISE PRECISE PRECI
Rigid-Flexible Neither or
ibl8 Moderately Moderately Both Moderately Markedly Moderately
FLEXIBLE- 
___ _ _ RIGID RIGID RIGID FLEXIBLE FLEXIBLE RIGID
Theoretician- IiIiIIBt 
Experimentalist arkedly Marked ly Moderately Both EXPERIMENT-|Markedly
9 It | ! tEXPERDIENTALIST- j'IS'£- T
THEORETICIAN THEORETICIAN THEORETICIAN THEORETICIAN THiEORETICIAN EXPERIMENTALIST
BothSpeculative- M ard
Analytical lMarkedly Moderately |Moderately SPECULATIVE- Moderately .arkedly
10
____SPECULATIVE SPECULATIVE SPECULATIVE ANALYTICAL SPECULATIVE ANALYTICAL
Extremely or
KEY: Significantly =
Markedly =
Moderately =
1.0 to 1.5
1.5 to 2.5
2.5 to 3.5
or 6.5 to 7.0
or 5.5 to 6.5
or 4.5 to 5.5
Neither or Both = 3.5 to 4.5
values on SD scales
values on SD scales
values on SD scales
values on SD scales
SEE FOOTNOTE 2 FOR AN EXPLANATION
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From the first set of interviews, five specific scientists were identified
as significant representatives for each of the three types. The perceptions
of each of these specific scientists by the 40 scientists were separately
2
measured in terms of a Semantic Differential (SD) consisting of 10 scales[3 6 ]2
The perceptions of three type I scientists, Si SI2, and SI1, were scaled;
,~~~n , were scaJled;
one type II scientist, Sii; one type III scientist, Siii; and finally,
one general category Y which referred to the designation "Yourself;" i.e.,
in addition to scaling five other scientists, each of the 40 scientists
scaled himself so that it could later be determined where the general body
of scientists lay in relation to the specific representatives of the various
types.
It should be noted that the decision to scale three type I scientists
was made for very specific reasons. In response to the question, "What
scientists are, in your opinion, most committed to their pet hypotheses
or theories and as a result least likely to shift their commitment as a
consequence of the Apollo data?," three scientists were consistently
mentioned over and over again. These three scientists were also nominated
as the most outstanding examples of type I scientists. More than any other
group of scientists, these scientists excited the jealous envy and hostility
3
of their peers. They also excited the most positive superlatives. They
not only dazzled their peers with their spectacular feats of speculative
theorizing but they also offended them with the abrasive, provocative, and
often agressive manner with which they presented and defended their theories.
These reasons alone warranted comparing these three type I scientists among
themselves as well as against the other types. In addition it was felt that it
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.was important enough to get a collective portrait of those scientists
who were perceived as most committed to their ideas to warrant the study
of three type I's.
Table 1 shows that there is a marked and systematic difference
between the perceptions of the types as we move across the table from
left to right. That is, if take the means (x) of the perceptions of
each of the 5 specific scientists, including the general category "yourself,"
Y, and lay them out on 10 straight lines (one line
for each of the 10 scales against which the types are being rated as
3indicated in Table 1) then SI is generally found at one extreme of the
3 2 1
scales, SIII at the other. Furthermore, S S , and SI1 bunch together;
3 2 1i.e., the differences between S3, Si, and S are inconsequential when
compared to the differences between themselves as a group and the other
types of scientists. Above all it should be noted that the differences
between types (Si SII, Y, and SIII ) are highly significant. We are not
dealing with borderline or trivial differences. A one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) reveals that the differences between the mean scores for
the types are statistically significant at an aL- level of less than 0.001, i.e.
<C<0.001. Furthermore, multidimensional scaling and correlational analyses [SO ]
reveal that the ordering pattern, SI 3 Si2 SI , SIi, Y, SIII , is
itself statistically significant. That is, not only are the differences
between the types significant but so is the relative placement (order)
of the types with respect to one another.
The significance of these results is as follows: (1) they add
needed support to the validity of the original typology, and (2), they give
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us some interesting insights regarding the psychological differences
between the Great and the Normal scientist [ ]. With regard to the
first point, if the specific scientists, SI , SI , SI , SIi, and SIII,
are really representative of the various types then it is comforting
that they at least fell on certain of the scales according to prior
expectations. For example, according to the original definitions of the
'3 2 1types one would expect that SI, SI , and SI would tend to fall toward
the biased end of the Biased-Impartial scale, SII in the middle, and
SIII toward the impartial end. (SII is the only scientist which does not
fall as expected on this scale.) The placements follow similarly on scales
3, 9, and 10. Scales 9 and 10 are particularly crucial since they literally
feed back the original dimensions on which the typology was initially
proposed. It would have been particularly distressing if the placements
on these scales turned out to be anything other than as expected. Of
course this by itself does not establish either the uniqueness or the
ultimate correctness of the typology but it is at least comforting that
it has survived the most elemental tests of it. The full report [33 ] of
this study presents an extensive number of validating exercises. The
typology survives every one of these critical tests.
With regard to'the second point, the differences between the
three type I scientists and the single type III scientist are most instructive.
In order to appreciate the significanceof these differences it is necessary
to point out that throughout the study SIII was the particular scientist
who was judged most representative of the average or typical scientist in
the lunar program. (It should be emphasized in this regard that throughout
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the study the scientists talked extremely freely about one another.
There were as a result many opportunities to obtain consistent portraits
of the various scientists. That is, the descriptions and inferences
with respect to the types are not based on isolated, infrequent observa-
tions.) The three type I scientists on the other hand were the ones who
were most frequently judged the outstandingextraordinary scientists of
the program, the scientists who most consistently stood at the creative
apex of the profession. It is thus both interesting and important to
compare the adjective profiles between these two rather distinct types,
I and III.
If the type I scientists most nearly correspond to Kuhn's
Great scientist (as I believe they do), and if the type III scientist
most nearly corresponds to the Normal scientist, then the results imply
that the Great scientist is more likely to be more creative in the pro-
duction of bold and speculative ideas. They are also most likely to be
the kinds of scientists who become most rigidly committed to their ideas.
That is, the three type I's were perceived as extremely creative in the
sense of'their being able to produce and having produced many original
innovative ideas over a long period of time and in this sense they were
regarded as extremely flexible. They possessed the requisite mental agility
and nimbleness of mind to see old problems in a new light and to perceive
(literally invent) highly imaginative patterns in a complex sets of data;
thus, the judgements of "brilliant," "theoretical," "generalist," "specu-
lative," and the tendency towards "vagueness." On the other hand, they
were perceived as extremely attached to their ideas once they were pro-
duced; thus, the strong judgements of "bias," "agressiveness," and
"rigidity." Indeed, independent exercises [33 ] establish that over a
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span of three years, there is virtually no perceived shift (according
to the 40 scientists) in the positions of each of the three type I
scientists with respect to certain scientific hypotheses with which they
have long been associated. This point cannot be overemphasized. Al-
though the psychological differences are interesting and-.important for
their own sake, they are even more important for what they imply for the
understanding of the growth and change of scientific ideas. While it is
beyond the scope of this paper to demonstrate how these psychological
differences operate in detail, it can be shown [33 ] what kinds of
rationalizations and rational arguments that different types use to
hang onto, preserve, as well as, change their ideas. In other words, under
certain circumstances, it is possible to relate explicitly differences in
psychology to the growth of a scientist's ideas.
The Bearing of the Social Psychology of
Research on the Orthodox View of Scientific
Theories, Kuhn, and Feyerabend: Modifications
and Revisions
At some point or another every philosophical view of science
is critically dependent upon the presumption of an observing scientist.
More specifically, every philosophical view of science makes certain
assumptions about the nature of scientific observations and/or observables
and their relationship to a scientific observer. In the case of the
orthodox or received view of scientific theories [13)47], the assumptions
take the form of assuming that there exists a class of certain entities
distinguished by their capability of being "directly observed" by a
human observer through his "direct sensory apparatus." It is also
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assumed that there exist certain theoretical entities which while they
cannot be directly observed can be sharply differentiated from the observational
entities. It is further assumed that while the theoretical entities are,
because of their hypothetical and inferrential status, problematic, the
observational entities are, by virtue of their ability to be "directly
observed," nonproblematic.
In a previous paper [34 ] I have argued that the notion of
direct observation or immediate apprehension is contradicted on every
count by an overwhelming body of behavioral evidence. With respect to
this evidence, the notion of direct observation is nonsensical. All the
behavioral evidence I am aware of suggests that all observation on the
part of anything resembling a human observer is mediated by the observer's
entire past behavioral and physical history, his current emotional state,
feelings, and future aspirations. In a word, all observations are observer
dependent, dependent upon the complicated and highly partial mental states
of some observer. Observations are thus not neutral because observers are
not neutral with respect to what they observe. Indeed for the act of
observation to even occur, it is necessary that the observer bring with him
some initial set of presuppositions towards what he expects and even
desires to see. On two counts then, observations are not theory free, and
hence, are anything but "direct". First, because in order to assess what
any particular observer contributes to what he observes we require a general
behavioral and physical theory of observation which relative to the class
of all other observers allows us to relate and compare the reports of
different observers.4 Second, in order to take any specific scientific
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observation we require some theory or model, no matter how crude or
unarticulated (and not necessarily unique), of the event or process we
wish to observe, particularly all the more that our observations take
place through complicated instrumentation [4,7]. The results of this
study [33 ] more than support these assertations. In a word, radically
different observers or types of scientists bring radically different
types of presuppositions with them to the field of scientific observation.
Hopefully the results of this study contribute to the eventual establishment
of a behavioral theory of scientific observation [ 8 ] that will allow us
eventually to compare the reports of different scientific observers. On
a more abstract level, the results of this study support a "presupposition-
5
dependent view of scientific theories."
As important as it is to raise severe challenges to the orthodox
view of scientific theories, an even more important task is that of pointing
out the modifications that the results of this study suggest to the views
of Kuhn and of Feyerabend. To recall briefly the views of both: Kuhn sees
science marked by long periods of normal development (Normal Science)
broken by occasional severe crises, or in his terms, "scientific revolutions."
During a period of Normal Science scientists largely work within an accepted
paradigm, an accepted largely implicit world-view. The accepted framework
or paradigm provides relatively clear-cut guidelines for all the facets
of scientific activity: it specifies the problems that will be worked on, the
methods that will be used in working on them, the basic vocabulary that will
be used for describing (recognizing) scientific problems, and above all a
common language, process, or medium for resolving the inevitable disagreements
or disputes that arise between scientists, data, theories. For the most part,
most scientists spend their life working within Normal Science, i. e.,
-24-
.extending and working out the problems within the current paradigms; very
few scientists are either prepared to work on or actually do work within
"extraordinary science, i.e., contribute to the overthrow of an accepted
paradigm. For the most part, scientific training is training for Normal
Science. There are times however when the current paradigms of Normal
Science are challenged, threatened, and even more rarely, overthrown
completely by a new paradigm which in turn becomes the paradigm of the
new period of Normal Science. Depending on how complete the revolution is,
and apparently for Kuhn they are rather complete, the disjuncture between
the old and new paradigms becomes severe. Old and new paradigm proponents
are unable to communicate across the gap; theoretical terms no longer
possess the same meanings; they take on the meanings of the paradigms with
which they are associated. As Toulmin has put it in characterizing Kuhn's
views, "a scientific revolution involves a complete change of intellectual
clothes [1 , p. 101]."
Feyerabend as well as Kuhn emphasizes the radical disjuncture
between competing scientific theories. However they argue it and reach it
via very different pathways. Kuhn's pathways are historical and social
psychological. He proposes radical disjuncture (or as it has been called
by some [Z3 ], "radical meaning variance theory") as a way to account for
the fact-of the growth and change in scientific theories, that science grows--
contrary to popular myth--not by the patient and step by step accumulation
of facts but by radical leaps and bounds. Feyerabend on the other hand [l4,i7J?
proposes radical disjuncture as a methodological principle, as a way of
doing good philosophy of science: scientists should always strive to produce
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the most radically differing counter-theories to the theories currently
in existence. If all data are dependent upon the use or presumption of
some theory for their production, and as is so often the case, the only
theory we have available is the theory we wish to test, then the data pro-
duced through the use of that theory will in general constitute far less
than the most powerful test of that theory. The test data will certainly
not constitute an independent test of the theory [3]. Faced with this
circumstance, the only way we can provide the strongest test of our theories
is to test them against data uncovered by some counter-theory. The severest
tests will be provided by the data that are derived from the theories that
are in sharpest disagreement with one another.
Needless to say both authors have come in for some severe
criticism. For example, both Kuhn and Feyerabend have been accused of
over-emphasizing, the discontinuities, the disagreements between successive
phases of the course of scientific development. They have been accused
of placing a greater emphasis on the conflict between competing theories,
paradigms, and scientists than actually exists or can be shown to exist.
In short they have been accused of viewing the successive phases between
competing theories or paradigms as an all or nothing phenomenom, i. e.,
as either perfect agreement or perfect disagreement. As Shapere has
put it:
...Kuhn has committed the mistake of thinking that
there are only two alternatives: absolute identity or
absolute difference. But the data at hand are the simi-
larities and differences; and why should these not be
enough to enable us to talk about more, and less, similar
views and, for certain purposes, to classify sufficiently
similar viewpoints together as, e.g.,cbeing in the same
tradition? After all, disagreements, proliferation of
competing alternatives, debate over fundamentals, both
substantive and methodological, are al]l more or less
present throughout the development of science; and there
are always guiding elements which are more or less common,
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even among what are classified as different 'traditions.'
By hardening the notion of a 'scientific tradition' into
a hidden unit, Kuhn is thus forced by a purely conceptual
point to ignore many important differences between scienti-
fic activities classified as being of the same tradition,
as well as important continuities between successive
traditions. This is the same type of excess into which
Feyerabend forced himself through his conception of
'theory' and 'meaning.' Everything that is of positive
value in the viewpoint of these writers, and much that
is excluded by the logic of their errors, can be kept if
we take account of these points [45, p. 71].
Both Kuhn and Feyerabend have also been criticized on the
grounds that their views lead to relativism, that if each theory or
paradigm defines its own terms, and that if the disjuncture between
strongly competing theories is complete, then how can we compare theories?
How can we say that one theory is better than another and on what grounds
are we justified in saying that progress has occurred just because one
theory has replaced another? Further if each theory supplied its own
criteria, then because of radical disjuncture again, how can we even com-
pare criteria let alone theories. And even further, if the terms differ
so radically from one theory to another, how can the data unearthed by
one theory be used to test another theory? If data only have meaning with
reference to their specific background theory, and if two theories differ
radically in meaning, how can the data from one theory have meaning with
respect to another theory and hence be used to test it?
While I consider myself basically in sympathy with the views of
Kuhn and Feyerabend, I recognize the validity of many of the arguments
of their critics. Even more the data from my own study allows me to support
a number of their critics points with empirical evidence as well as with
theoretical arguments. And yet their critics are not all right either.
There is a sense in which Kuhn and Feyerabend are right and a sense
in which they are wrong, or better yet, incomplete. If, as their critics
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have pointed out it is not an "all or nothing" choice between competing
paradigms or theories, then it is not an "all or nothing" choice between
Kuhn and Feyerabend. There is a point in between.
The central issue is that of "agreement." Kuhn is right when
he emphasizes the tremendous conflicts and disagreements that exist between
competing paradigms, theories, and scientists. The data of this study more
than supports him on this point. He is even right when he emphasizes that
there are occasions for which there are theories, paradigms, and scientists
which, for all practical purposes, may be regarded as in total disagreement.
However, Kuhn is wrong when he either fails or neglects to point out that
what is true on the micro level is not necessarily true on the macro level.
That is, there are individual scientists who for all practical purposes
may be regarded as in extreme disagreement with one another, and indeed
the results of this study would make it seem that there are issues on which
all scientists disagree some and maybe even all of the time. But likewise
there are also individual scientists who for all practical purposes may
be regarded as in complete agreement with one another. Since both of
these forces or tendencies operate in every system, it would seem false
to characterize a system (a collectivity of scientists) as existing in
either a state of total or near total disagreement or agreement.
There is a more telling way to put this point. It seems to
me that the data of this study suggests that in every social system
there are those kinds of individuals ("types") who have a compulsive
need to make revolutions, to disagree as strongly as possible with
established ways of thinking--paradigms if one prefers to call them.
These individuals have an almost consuming need to produce radical counter
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ideas and theories to those currently in existence if not in vogue.' They
seem to need to go out of their way to produce extremely novel ways of
looking at old phenomena. However the data also suggests that there are
also those kinds of individuals who have a compulsive (security) need to
preserve continuity with old established ways of thinking, to differ as
little as possible from the tried and the true.
Rather than complete disagreement or agreement being an actual state of
affairs, they are instead "states of Mind," attitudinal Ideals [,35],
or in Toulmin's terms [l1 ] the divergent "disciplinary aims" of radically
distinct types of men. There are, in other words, scientists who act
to bring about "revolution in perpetuity" but there are also
those who act to preserve the status quo, to bring about "continuity in
perpetuity." Even more so, there is a large body of scientists in between
who are blends of these two extremes and much more besides. To say then that
after a scientific revolution, there is complete lack of communication between
the two sides is to distort the situation. It is a partial truth at
best in the sense that there are at any one point in time--before, during,
and after a revolution--those scientists who are unable to communicate
across any one of a hundred different gaps--theories, attitudes, issues.
But there are also those kinds of individual scientists or forces acting
within the system whose Ideal is to discover links between the past and
the present. It is too much then to say that after a revolution there is
a complete breakdown between the two sides. For one this assumes a
far greater degree of cohesiveness and homogenity between "sides", groups,
or schools of thought than is warranted. I see as much diversity within
the system or Game of Science at any one point in time--even within supposedly
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tight common factions--as between successive time periods. In other words,
as much as there are strong forces ("revolutionaries") acting to produce
drastic changes in The Game at any one point in time, there are also just
as strong forces acting to keep The Game the same as it has always been
("reactionaries"), and further yet, there are those ("moderates") acting
to steer a course in between, to usher in the new while acting to preserve
its links with the past.
There is even a stronger way yet to put these points and one
that brings Feyerabend into the discussion. Michael Martin [Z7%] for
one has raised a particularly interesting series of questions and challenges
to Feyerabend's position. Although it is not exclusively associated with
Feyerabend, Martin subsumes Feyerabend's position under the general heading
of Extremc Theoretical Pluralism (ETP) which Martin characterizes as
follows:
ETP: Develop as many alternative research programs [theories]
as possible at all stages of development [of a science]
whether the prevailing research program is progressive
or not [2, p. 5]!
As a strong alternative to ETP, Martin lists another position which he
labels Theoretical Monism (TM):
TM: Do not develop alternative research programs in any science
at any stage of development if the prevailing research
program is progressive [ , p. 5]!
There are of course as Martin notes an infinite number of other positions
in betweene.g., for a particular set of (some) circumstances in the his-
torical development of a science, develop some (not necessarily "as many")
alternative research programs whether the prevailing research program is
progressive or not. As Martin notes, the interesting question is,
-30-
which program is "best" for which science at which stage in its develop-
ment?
There are a number of important implications that follow from
Martin's treatment of the issue: One, whether ETP, TM, or some other
alternative actually holds or not is not merely a matter of "mere empirical"
historical research. It would be extremely difficult for any finite set
of observations on so complicated a phenomenon as science to establish
a general rule like ETP or TM. Two, thus, although rules like ETP or
TM can be empirically researched, e.g., for the grounds of their empirical
applicability, they are not solely or merely empirical propositions or
hypotheses to be empirically confirmed or rejected. In a more fundamental
sense, ETP and TM express the basic metaphysical or intellectual commitments
of their proponents about the nature of science. If anything, they are
maxims or commands--directives--("develop," "do not develop") to view
science in a very particular way prior to the gathering of empirical data
on it. Rather than following from empirical observation and confirmation,
they are instead prior to it. In this sense it is not a question of
Feyerabend's being "right" or "wrong" but that his position merely expresses
one stance out of the range of possible stances towards the nature of science
(i.e., towards studying it, characterizing it, etc.).
While granting this, to me one of the most interesting implications
of the data of this study is that it suggests a novel way of studying various
stances towards the nature of science. If one takes this study to its utmost
limits then one can assert that ETP, TM, and all the other alternatives
in between are not just abstract intellectual possibilities but they are
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also psychological realities. For every abstract philosophical position
that can be formulated with respect to the nature of science, there exists
a corresponding "real" scientist whose behavior and attitudes embodies
that abstract position. Following this line of thought further, one way
then to study the implications of a proposed abstract position is to trace
through its effects via a postulated, corresponding human embodiment of
that or any other position; i.e., study the attitudes of those who embody
that position.
In sum, I think Kuhn was right in his basic appeal to social
psychology and history as one way of doing philosophy of science. Where
Kuhn went wrong in my opinion was in his detailed application of social
psychology. In fact it can be said that Kuhn wasn't social psychological
enough to be able to give a good accounting of the workings of scientists.
For instance, Kuhn accords far too passive a role to individual scientists
in bringing about a revolution [ 1 ]. As I have stressed, there are
certain very specific kinds of scientists who actually seek to promote
6
revolution.
Likewise it can be said that for one who espouses radical or
Extreme Theoretical Pluralism, Feyerabend wasn't radical enough in
envisioning alternatives to his alternatives, how his ideas might be
tested by other radical alternatives such as those outlined by Martin.
In a way however these are merely minor complaints. Kuhn and Feyerabend
still deserve much credit for opening up some needed and new pathways in
the philosophy of science.
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Concluding Remarks
Forty or so scientists is obviously a rather small sample size
on which to base such weighty generalizations about the nature of science.
If as the cliche goes--and it is a cliche--that "90% of all scientists
who have ever lived are alive today," how can one found such strong
generalizations on so small a sample? If the only legitimate basis for
extrapolation or generalization is the size of one's sample, then the
answer quite properly is that "one can't." However I believe that there
are other legitimate reasons for extrapolation. If only for no other
reason than to encourage and to challenge others to do similar inter-
disciplinary studies of science, I believe the results of this study
should be generalized as far as possible. Philosophers of science do
not hesitate for one moment to make all kinds of universal statements
about the nature of science based on no empirical data at all, or worse
yet, on the empirical data of what in their imagination they construe as
the behavior of scientists. If philosophers are justified in doing this
based on no data, effectively on a statistical sample size of zero scientists,
then I should like to extrapolate and generalize based on a sample size
of slightly better than forty.8
A word also needs to be said again about the potential charges
of psychologism. The study on which this paper is based is admittedly
heavily psychological. However it is not in my mind to be labeled psycho-
logistic because I do not believe in psychologism as a philosophy. I have
not been out to reduce every matter and concern of science to psychology.
I don't believe that this can be done. Even stronger I don't believe this
should be done. I do believe however that standing behind every aspect
of science there can be shown to be operating exceedingly deep and personal
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elements. However I also believe that a set of rational rules and public
procedures also enfuses the entire structure. In this sense this study
is not out to replace the logic of science but rather to question whether
we can have an effective understanding of how the logical operates in
science independently of the social psychological. In short I have been
out to build the strongest case possible for psychology, not to make
psychology the sole basis for studying or characterizing science. To
replace the "logic of science" tradition entirely by the "social psychology
of science" tradition would in my opinion be no more than to replace one
reductionism with another. If in spite of this I have still been guilty
of psychologism, then all I can say is that much of our philosophy of
science has been guilty of "logicism."/If so, then this study is a needed
counter to that overemphasis.
In sum, it should not be the case that because an enterprise
involves the gathering of empirical evidence it is therefore to be regarded
as "merely empirical." Rather, it is the. intent and the spirit with which the
data is gathered that makes the enterprise merely empirical or not. The spirit
with which many social psychologists have studied science, their lack of under-
standing and appreciation for philosophical issues, and finally, their inability
to draw the fullest implications of their date--all of these have tended
to make the social psychology of research merely empirical in the past.
I hope that I have demonstrated that this need not be a necessary and
universal characteristic of all applications of the social psychology of
research. We need to experiment with even more ways of combining seemingly
and traditionally diverse fields of inquiry so that we can break down the
silly barriers that so often separate disciplines and lead us into believing
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that this or that aspect of science is the unique province of this or
that discipline to study. As Russell Ackoff has put it, "Nature is not
organized in the same way that universities are [ i ]." By not raising
perpetual challenges to the organization of our disciplines, we ensure
our ignorance of Nature and of our science.
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FOOTNOTES
1. This statement is interesting for the reason that it corresponds
almost exactly with Murray Davis's [11 ] fascinating notions of
what makes a theory "interesting." That is, if a theory is to be
interesting, it must differ substantially from our ordinary sense ex-
pectations but not too much or "you'll get labeled as a crackpot."
For an extended discussion, see [11 ].
2. A Semantic Differential is a social science technique for obtaining
a semantic profile of the "meaning" of a concept or set of concepts
to a set of respondents. The concept whose meaning is to be deter-
mined is placed over a pre-determined number of scales. Each
scale is bounded by a contrary pair of adjectives. Thus, for
example, the first scale in Table 1 is Biased-Impartial. Each scale
has the numbers 1 through 7 on it. If a respondent feels that for
the particular concept he is rating that its meaning is best captured
by one of the polar adjectives then he checks the numbers "1" or "7"
For example, if a respondent felt that a particular specific
scientist was at the extreme Biased end of the scale, he would
check "1;" if at the extreme Impartial end, he'd check "7;" he'd
check "4" if he felt the scientist was neither Biased nor Impartial,
if he was undecided, or indifferent to the scale. If a respondent
felt a scientist leaned toward one end of the scale or the other
but not the extreme, he'd check a number in between, e.g., "3."
The entries in Table 1 give which adjective of the adjective pairs
the average (x) of the respondents numerical values for each SD
scale most nearly correspond. A Semantic Profile is typically
constructed for each concept being rated by connecting the average
values for each scale. More sophisticated uses of the technique
allow one to compare concepts by means of more complex statistical
analyses, e.g., factor analysis [ 36].
3. Throughout the study, no matter what the topic that was being dis-
cussed, equally strong and opposing opinions were expressed on
both sides of it. Again it would seem that it is only in idealized
accounts, or as Kuhn has so rightly stressed [25 ], it is only in
idealized "after the fact" textbooks that we ever find scientists
in complete agreement on any issue, scientific as well as non-
scientific. Of all the divergent opinions, the strongest were
expressed with respect to the perceptions of the three type I's;
for example:
Scientist A on C Scientist B on C
"C is an out and out crackpot; "Of course C is a scientist.
I no longer regard him as a It is valuable for science to
scientist. He does more harm have people like C. The system
to science than he does good. would be the worse off without
Science would be better off him."
without him."
Scientist G on C_ D,_E Scientist H on C. D E
"C, D, and E are examples "C, D, and E make people
of the lunatic fringe.': extremely mad but they also
spur them on. They are the
creative vanguard of the
profession."
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4. Consider Churchman on this point:
The third level [of standardization of data] consists of adjusting
all or almost all data to standards by means of "laws" that enable
one to say: if report R1 was made at time t1 in circumstance z1
by a person having properties will w1 2 , and so on, then report R0
would have been made at time t in circumstance z by a person having0 
properties w0 1, w0 2, and so on. The last level most clearly approxi-
mates the function of measurement, because it permits the broadest
use of the information [ 8 , p. 121].
5. Without going into the full range and kinds of questions that had to
do with the bearing of philosophical and methodological issues on
science that were raised with the respondents, it can be said that
the scientists were extremely sensitive to the particular issue of the
theory-ladenness of observations. They repeatedly stressed the point
that it was impossible to make a single observation in science without
the presumption of some theory (not necessarily unique). As one might
suspect, the sophistication of the respondents with respect to philo-
sophical issues was rather confined. They were most sophisticated
with respect to issues that bore most directly on their everyday
concerns (e.g., the relation of theory to data) and least sophisticated
withl respect to issues that were farthest away (e.g., whether it was necessary
for science to make metaphysical presuppositions. It should be noted in
this regard that the type I scientists tended to be a bit more sophisticated
than the rest of their colleagues with respect to the deeper philosophical
issues.
6. In another sense it can be said that Kuhn forgot to incorporate one
of his earlier papers which contained precisely the psychology he
needed. I refer to Kuhn's paper, "Essential Tension: Tradition and
Innovation in Scientific Research" [ 24], in which he discussed that
the progress (advancement) of science depended on a tug-of-war between
two fundamental types: the innovator and the traditionalist. The one
was dedicated to breaking new ground; the other, to preserving the past.
7. It is a cliche because when wasn't there ever a time that this couldn't
be said? Surely there were scientists before the term was invented.
The official term is only a couple of hundred years old at best anyway.
If we define a scientist as one who embodies a certain set of psycho-
logical attributes, as one who views Nature in certain prescribed ways,
then there is no reason to believe that we have not always had scientists
with us at least as far back as the human race began to develop differ-
entiated personality structures.
8. As an aside I find it amusing to note that in the few times I have
talked about this study before public groups, there are always those
few scientists in the audience who are insistent that if I had studied
such and such a group or their particular brand of science (discipline),
I wouldn't have found such outrageous behavior. What's so amusing is
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(8. con't)
that each group of scientists is so willing to believe that the
other group is outrageous, not themselves of course!
Nevertheless I would be the first to admit that the results of this
study might not apply in their entirety to every group of scientists,
but only in the sense, that not every group might exhibit the effects
reported here with the same strength and degree of clarity. Thus,
for example, while I admit that the particular group I studied may
be more aggressive than the "average," I would still expect every
scientific group to exhibit noticeable degrees of aggressiveness
because of what's known from the prior literature on the psychology of
scientists [12, 30, 52]. Obviously though this study should be replicated
across different disciplines, cultures,, laboratories, universities, etc.
I hope my results encourage others to do this.
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